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Has anyone else read this book?
The comments seem like none of those people have ever read this book - yes, including Mr. Jones. I'm not even thirty pages in and I have learned nothing, except that the cartoon is like vaudeville, and that Felix was awesome. (I've read
Felix: The Twisted Tale of the World's Most Famous Cat, and I'm sorry to say, it was a much better read than this.)
He claims to start in 1928 - and yet talks about nothing but the 19th century for a good two pages. The first chapter is a waste of pages and words.
The reason I'm bringing this up is because I'm attempting to write a book on the history of American animation. The books I have found are awful. If anyone could help me find either books pertaining to this subject or could point me in the right direction, I'd be forever indebted. I took this book from the library assuming it would be the best thing I've ever read pertaining to this subject.
In response to Seven Minutes
by Norman M. Klein
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For philosophy, framing the phenomenological gift aligns an eidetic
point that begins to bracket in Nothingness, which may or may not give rise to the Encounter. It is a matter of thinking about contingency. The primacy
of thinking about contingency is simply the facticity of existing there within
the Unconscious and the ether of unreal atoms—parallelism ad nausea. “The world
is a ‘gift’ that we have been given,” Althusser elucidated, “the ‘fact of the
fact’ that we have not chosen, and it ‘opens up’ before us in the facticity of
its contingency, and even beyond this facticity, in what is not merely an
observation, but a ‘being-in-the-world’ that commands all possible Meaning.” Opening
this gift does frame “being-in-the-world.” There is the possibility of meaning and the
meaning of the possibility—there is an effect of fictional subjectivity. There
are effects stemming from the facticity of this very contingency of
being-in-the-world. It is an eidetic effect as philosophical effect. Philosophy postulates eidetic points. As materialist portrait, nothingness is
nothing but the theoretical understanding of non-materiality--the original of Being-- and hence there is a retroactive excursion, more or less, that may or may not find nothingness as a material object that is idyllically graced by the Philosophical
Void.
In response to Philosophy of the Encounter
by Louis Althusser
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Not new. not a review by Marx.
These translations are not, as is alleged here, "new". Hanfi translated them 40 years ago. The review "Luther between Strauss and Feuerbach", quoted from here, has been known not to be by Marx for almost as long. See MECW Vol. 1, 1975.
In response to The Fiery Brook
by Ludwig Feuerbach
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How do we make sense of Karl Marx's utter disdain for
In a letter to Engels of 14 February 1858, Marx says: “Moreover a longish article on Bolívar elicited objections from Dana because, he said, it is written in a ‘partisan style’, and he asked me to cite my authorities. This I can, of course, do, although it is a singular demand. As regards the ‘partisan style’, it is true that I departed somewhat from the tone of a cyclopedia. To see the dastardly, most miserable and meanest of blackguards described as Napoleon I was altogether too much. Bolívar is a veritable Soulouque [the former slave, later President of Haiti].” Karl Marx's scathing 1858 entry on Simón Bolívar for The New American Cyclopaedia (1858): Bolívar y Ponte, Simon, the “liberator” of Colombia, born at Caracas, July 24, 1783, died at San Pedro, near Santa Martha, Dec. 17, 1830. He was the son of one of the familias Mantuanas, which, at the time of the Spanish supremacy, constituted the creole nobility in Venezuela. In compliance with the custom of wealthy Americans of those times, at the early age of 14 he was sent to Europe. From Spain he passed to France, and resided for some years in Paris. In 1802 he married in Madrid, and returned to Venezuela, where his wife died suddenly of yellow fever. After this he visited Europe a second time, and was present at Napoleon’s coronation as emperor, in 1804, and at his assumption of the iron crown of Lombardy, in 1805. In 1809 he returned home, and despite the importunities of Joseph Felix Ribas, his cousin, he declined to join in the revolution which broke out at Caracas, April 19, 1810 but, after the event, he accepted a mission to London to purchase arms and solicit the protection of the British government. Apparently well received by the marquis of Wellesley, then secretary for foreign affairs, he obtained nothing beyond the liberty to export arms for ready cash with the payment of heavy duties upon them. On his return from London, he again withdrew to private life, until, Sept. 1811, he was prevailed upon by Gen. Miranda, then commander-in-chief of the insurgent land and sea forces, to accept the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the staff, and the command of Puerto Cabello, the strongest fortress of Venezuela.
In response to The Bolivarian Revolution
by Simon Bolivar
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Fetishized contrarianism?
After giving Richard Seymour an audience by reading his essay, "The Genocidal Imagination of Christopher Hitchens," I've decided that the purchase and investigation of his "Unhitched" effort will be worth neither my dime nor my time. Which is oddly a shame, because I chase a high that Seymour can only understand as fetishized contrarianism, but which bonded me to the Hitch, however briefly, as his student: it includes a passion for having new evidence infect your most cherished beliefs so that your former identity must evolve and so that your newfound "hypocrisy" must be reckoned with as a matter of intellectual rigor. One of my cherished beliefs, I'll admit, is that even when Christopher was wrong, he was principled. Despite sentimental personal attachments, Mr. Seymour MIGHT have persuaded me with evidence. Instead, he appears to think that Hitchens was an unprincipled scoundrel. I understand Mr. Seymour is praised for the extensiveness and exhaustiveness of his argumentation -- even his essays are brimming with footnotes. Taking a cue from Seymour and substituting amateur psychoanalysis for de rigeur analysis, I'm inclined to say that it's as easy to dismiss the author of this book as a person with a tribal bone to pick, and an education in fashionable nonsense that makes his bone picking sound more legitimate than it is. During the time that I studied with the late Hitch, my long term girlfriend was Afghan and Muslim. Seymour's readers would do well to hear her sentiments on the man's "blatant Islamophobia" and on the Taliban who had beggared her country. But if her opinions squared with his, whatever would they do? We have Ayan Hirsi Ali to reference, for a start. I hope Mr. Seymour and Verso enjoy the dimes this book reels in. The rarity of the condition to which I referred above--the addiction to the high of having your most cherished notions shattered by evidence and your tribe membership revoked as a result--is still a rare enough addiction.
In response to Unhitched
by Richard Seymour